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1. Introduction 
Prior to accession to the EU, the Central and Eastern European new member states have 
adopted a range of labour market institutions similar to those in the Western European 
countries (Riboud et al. 2003). Since the period of transition from planned to market 
economies, many of these institutions have been in a continuous process of reform and 
adaptation. In some cases, policy makers have justified the changes by the need for greater 
flexibility in the economy, in order to accommodate a dynamic process of growth and 
catching-up with Western European income levels, of which those of the CEE countries only 
make up only little more than a half. In the present paper, we consider the possible role of 
labour market institutions in either fostering or hindering growth and convergence to Western 
European income levels.  
When speaking of the influence of labour market institutions on growth and output 
convergence, a relevant question is also whether and to what extent the institutions 
themselves are subject to convergence in the process of integration into the EU. There are 
several channels through which labour market institutions may be influenced in this process. 
Directives and transnational agreements may directly help shape national institutions of social 
protection or employment regulation. Labour unions in the new member states collaborate 
with and receive assistance from their EU counterparts and EU-level organizations. Another 
channel through which convergence might occur is imitation, whereby a country adopts 
institutions similar to that of a neighbouring western country. In outlining the trends in the 
development of the labour market institutions in the NMS, we therefore try to compare these 
to those in the western European countries. As for the time period, we consider the period 
from 1995 to the latest period with data available, thus concentrating less on specifically 
transition-related reforms than on more recent trends in the decade prior to EU accession. 
We start out by reviewing some of the previous studies on the relationship between labour 
market institutions and productivity growth. Most of the existing studies concentrate on one 
or a few labour market institutions at a time, whereas there have been relatively few empirical 
studies that include a wider set of labour market institutions in  growth models (as in e.g. 
Nickell, Layard (1999) and Buchele and Christensen (1999)). We find that for a number of 
labour market institutions, there exist theoretical models predicting both positive and negative 
effects on productivity and productivity growth. The signs of the effects vary also in different 
empirical studies.  
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After giving background data on the developments of labour market institutions in the new 
member states, we then estimate the relationship between labour market institutions and 
productivity growth based on a panel of OECD countries over the period 1970-1999. We also 
try to examine the effects of these institutions empirically in a smaller data set that includes 
also the new member states.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some results from the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effects of labour market institutions on productivity growth. 
Section 3 briefly reviews the labour market institutions in the Central and Eastern European 
new member states and their recent developments. Section 4 looks at the relationship between 
labour market institutions and productivity growth based on the past experience of the OECD 
countries and more recent data on the NMS. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Labour market institutions and productivity 
Labour market institutions may influence growth in various ways. First, institutions may 
affect the accumulation of factor inputs, physical or human capital. Although arguably input 
accumulation may be less important for long-run growth rates, it can certainly matter for 
catching up in levels of productivity. Second, apart from input accumulation, labour market 
institutions can affect growth by influencing total factor productivity. The relevant 
mechanisms here could be e.g. their effect on the relative ease of “creative destruction” 
processes in the economy, but a number of other channels may also be important. In the 
following, we briefly review some theoretical and empirical results from previous studies on 
these relationships. We consider in turn labour taxes, unemployment benefits, labour unions, 
employment protection legislation, and active labour market policies.  
Labour taxes 
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) examine the growth effects of labour taxes in an overlapping-
generation model. In their framework, taxation of labour affects growth rates via their effect 
on employment. If higher taxes lead to an increase in labour costs and a decrease in 
employment, this increases the capital-labour ratio, reducing the marginal product of capital 
and discouraging investment. Furthermore, in their model the lower employment rate, 
lowering the incomes of young individuals, decreases their savings, which also leads to less 
investment. The growth effects of these changes in unemployment may be permanent or 
transitory, depending on the form of the production function. Based on a sample of OECD 
countries, Widmalm (2001) finds evidence that the share of taxation levied on personal 
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income, and also tax progressivity, have negative effects on growth. She suggests that this 
may be due to distortionary effects of tax progressivity on educational decisions and thus to 
human capital accumulation. Manovskii (2002) argues, on the contrary, that progressive 
labour income taxation encourages workers to temporarily accept lower incomes in order to 
spend more time training and earn higher income later, and the resultant increase in human 
capital accumulation is beneficial for growth.  
Employment protection 
Employment protection can affect productivity growth in several different ways. On the one 
hand, employment protection raises the cost of hiring and firing employees, thereby reducing 
the rate of labour reallocation away from less to more productive activities. On the other hand, 
employment protection improves job security, which may aid worker participation, whereas 
the resultant longer job tenures may be associated with more on-the-job training and human 
capital investments. Nickell and Layard (1999) consider the positive effects to productivity 
growth as more likely. However, several other authors emphasize the adverse effects of 
employment protection. Mortensen (2004) shows in a Schumpeterian growth model how 
employment protection can lead to a lower incentive to innovate. Saint-Paul (2000) shows 
that high employment protection favours “secondary”, less risky innovation activities that 
improve existing products with more stable demand, while primary innovation is more likely 
to be concentrated in countries with more flexible employment regulations. He finds observed 
innovation patterns in Europe and the U.S. to be consistent with these predictions. An 
empirical study by OECD (2003) examines the effect of employment protection across 
industries with different innovation characteristics. Their results indicate that employment 
protection legislation (EPL) may reduce R&D intensity in industries where technological 
change entails high firm and worker turnover, whereas it matters less in those high-
technology industries in which innovation processes are cumulative, i.e. supported by firm-
specific workforce skills that evolve in parallel with technology. Importantly, the effects of 
EPL on R&D activities were also found to interact with the degree of co-ordination and to 
vary by industry, while becoming obscured at the aggregate level.  
Collective bargaining 
The theoretical impact of union wage bargaining on growth has been studied in a number of 
settings. The effects may be negative, due to investment-reducing effects of union activities 
(Nickell, Layard 1999). However, Palokangas (2004) argues that union wage pressures 
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encourage firms to seek higher productivity through R&D activities, which increases growth 
in the longer run. A similar result is reported in Palokangas (1996). Lingens (2003) examines 
the case in which unions bargain the wages of the low-skilled, and finds that the effect of 
unions on growth is ambiguous, depending on the elasticity of substitution between high-
skilled and low-skilled labour. Lingens (2004) discusses the union effects in a variety of 
neoclassical as well as endogenous growth models and concludes that in a majority of models, 
union wage bargaining slows down the rate of economic growth. 
A number of empirical studies of the effect of unions on productivity growth tend to support 
the view that on average, union activities reduce growth. Menezes-Filho et al. (1998) find that 
the effects are nonlinear: some level of union power is beneficial for R&D investment, but the 
effects turn negative once it passes a certain threshold, or if the unions only bargain over 
wages. Booth (1995), reviewing earlier studies of US and British evidence, concludes that on 
average, the impact of unionisation on productivity and productivity growth is negative. 
OECD (1997) cites empirical studies by Dowrick (1993) and Heitger (1987), which have 
found a U-shaped relationship between corporatism and productivity growth, such that 
economies with intermediate levels of union power grow more slowly. Padovano and Galli 
(2003) study a panel of 18 OECD countries over a period of 39 years, finding evidence of a 
significant negative impact of corporatism on growth and confirm the U-shaped relationship 
and a negative effect of unionisation on growth. However, Nickell and Layard (1999) suggest 
that negative effects of union activities may be mitigated by appropriate response from the 
management, such as introducing participation programs.  
Unemployment benefits 
There are a number of studies in which unemployment insurance affects productivity through 
the matching process and increase in the number of more productive, higher-capital jobs. 
Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) argue that unemployment insurance increases labour 
productivity by providing incentives for workers to seek higher-productivity jobs as well as 
for the employers to create such jobs. Kumar (2002) argues that unemployment benefits 
reduce the matching rate of workers, thereby increasing capital investment and boosting 
workers’ productivity. Centeno and Novo (2005) find empirical support to the positive impact 
of the generosity of unemployment insurance on the job match quality. In an endogenous 
growth model by Corneo and Marquardt (2000), the growth effects of unemployment 
insurance can be neutral or positive, depending on whether it is financed by workers or by 
firms. However, in a model by Young (2004), any level of unemployment insurance leads to 
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lower levels of capital stock and growth, since lower employment reduces the marginal 
product of capital, and this, together with a reduced need for precautionary savings due to 
unemployment insurance, lowers investment. 
Active labour market policies 
Active labour market policies (ALMP) could be expected to be beneficial for growth. 
Measures such as job placement services, job clubs etc can improve the matching process and 
reduce unemployment, whereas various types of training are meant to directly increase the 
prospective workers’ productivity. In practice, the effects depend on the extent to which such 
policies are effective. Empirical evidence on this is mixed. Calmfors et al. (2001), examining 
Swedish ALMP programmes, find no evidence of training programmes’ positive effects on 
employment or of improved matching efficiency. Boone and van Ours (2004) analyze 20 
OECD countries over the period 1980-1999 and find labour market training to be the most 
effective among active measures in reducing unemployment, but do not find any effect of job 
subsidies. OECD (2005) find that job-search assistance often has a large impact, but 
emphasize that even similar programmes can have different effects depending on their details 
and context. An overview of recent microeconomic evaluation studies can be found in RWI 
Essen (2005).  
Summary 
Predictions from theoretical models with regard to productivity growth effects of labour 
market institutions are varied. For most institutions, there are valid theoretical reasons for 
both positive and negative effects on growth. In empirical studies, the more consistent results 
have been those for the negative effects of labour taxes and unions. Employment protection 
has been found to be negatively associated with total factor productivity growth in industry-
level studies, but positively in cross-country aggregate growth regressions.  
3. Labour market institutions in the NMS 
Taxation of labour 
A recommendation often made to the Central and Eastern European countries is to reduce 
their tax burden on labour. Indeed, both the average tax wedge on labour and the implicit tax 
rates on labour (European Commission, Structures…, 2005) are slightly above the EU-15 
average. There is also substantially less variation in the levels of labour taxation among the 
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CEE than in the EU-15 countries. In part, the high levels of labour taxation in CEE countries 
have been imposed by the transition process. The initial slump in output, extensive labour 
reallocation and the excess of labour with redundant qualifications brought about massive 
unemployment and increased social expenditure, which had to be financed by high taxes on 
the employed. Other factors, e.g. the aging populations, have also played a role. The structure 
of taxation in the CEE countries differs from that typical in the EU in its relatively higher 
share of consumption taxes and lower share of capital taxes.  
Figure 3.1. Implicit tax rates on labour in the EU, 1995 and 2003  
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Source: European Commission (2005). CEE-7 excludes Poland.  
The general trend of taxation of labour in the CEE member states appears to be downwards.1 
Implicit tax rates on labour have decreased in Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Slovenia and 
Slovakia, while there has been a slight increase in the Czech Republic. Over the past decade, 
the new member states have also converged in their levels of overall tax burdens, but diverged 
from the old EU member states.  
While the level of labour taxation is close to the EU average, their tax systems generally 
exhibit less progressivity. The Baltic states and Slovakia have adopted flat income taxes, 
while other countries such as Hungary and Slovenia have reduced the number of tax brackets 
over the period under review. Tax wedges for low-wage earners, on the other hand, are on 
average higher in the CEE than in the EU-15 countries (Võrk et al. 2006). In several 
                                                 
1 Note that Figure 3.1 only illustrates developments up to 2003, but significant reforms have taken place or are 
planned  since then (e.g. Slovakia’s 2004 flat tax reform, Estonian and Lithuanian income tax reductions, etc. For 
details, see European Commission (2005). 
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countries, one can observe that although implicit tax rates on labour have decreased, tax 
wedges for low-wage earners have increased, which is possibly due to “bracket creep”, e.g. by 
the increasing share of the wages exceeding the threshold of non-taxable income.  
Unemployment benefit replacement rates 
Under the conditions of planned economy, unemployment was very low in Central and 
Eastern European countries. With the transition to market economies, unemployment also 
emerged as a problem and it was necessary to introduce some forms of unemployment 
assistance. Systems of unemployment insurance were introduced in most countries and 
initially the benefit levels were fairly generous, but over time the fiscal pressures mounted as 
unemployment rose, and several countries have had to cut replacement rates (Vodopivec et al. 
2003). Some changes have occurred also in the period under review. Benefit replacements 
were lowered in Czech Republic in 1998, and Poland changed the replacement rate in 1997 
from the previous 36% of average wage to flat-rate benefit (which is differentiated according 
to the length of prior economic activity). Hungary introduced changes in UI benefits in 1997, 
introducing a single benefit replacement rate, which previously had been differentiated 
according to the duration of unemployment. Estonia, on the other hand, introduced an 
unemployment insurance system in 2003 which was more generous than the previously 
applied flat-rate unemployment assistance benefit system, under which replacement rates 
were as low as 7%. In part, the system was introduced to comply with the European Social 
Charter.  
Figure 3.2. Expenditure on passive labour market policy in the EU,  
% of GDP normalised on the per cent unemployment rate 
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Source: Eurostat (2006), OECD Employment Outlook (1999-2005), Paas et al. (2003), 
Vodopivec et al. (2003), authors’ calculations 
At present, replacement rates generally range from 50% to 70%. The unemployment 
insurance systems are generally much less generous than in EU-15 countries in their benefit 
durations. Typically, it is possible for the unemployed to receive insurance benefits for a 
period of 6 to 12 months, in some cases the duration depends on work experience. The overall 
generosity of the system thus depends on not only the benefit replacement rates but also 
duration of payment and eligibility rules. If the latter are too restrictive, they may exclude a 
significant share of the unemployed in the economy. Eligibility rules matter also for 
individuals’ work incentives, since becoming unemployed is a much less attractive option if 
the likelihood that one might not fulfil the conditions of eligibility for unemployment 
insurance benefits is higher or more uncertain.  
Figure 3.2 shows passive labour market measures as a percentage of GDP, normalised on the 
per cent unemployment rate, as a measure of generosity of unemployment insurance systems, 
which depends on all the parameters of replacement rates, benefit duration, and coverage. 
This measure can be thought of as the share of GDP devoted to passive labour market 
measures per percentage point of the unemployment rate. As can be seen from Figure 3.2, this 
summary measure of unemployment insurance generosity is much lower in the Central and 
Eastern European countries. In a number of NMS such as Latvia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia, it has declined over time, while it has remained stable in Lithuania and the Czech 
Republic. Estonia is an exception with an increase, but it is notable that despite the nominally 
comparable replacement rates and payment durations, the overall level of expenditure is still 
low compared to other NMS states. However, Vodopivec et al. (2003) note that in CEE 
countries, expenditure has been increasing on other, means-tested income support schemes 
that are also available to the unemployed. When assessing the effects of generosity of 
unemployment insurance on work incentives, measures involving only the parameters of UI 
systems must therefore by interpreted with some caution.  
Unions 
Unions are generally much weaker in the CEE member states than in the EU-15. As of 2002, 
average union density in the eight new member states stood at 23%, considerably lower than 
PRAXIS Working Papers No 27/2007 
 11
the EU-15 average of 43% (EIRO 2003).2 The differences between new and old member 
states are even greater when the coverage of collective bargaining is considered: the average  
coverage rate (weighted by the size of the labour force in each country) in nine new member 
states (ten NMS less Malta) is 37%, only about a half of the EU-14 figure of 72% (EU-15 
excluding Greece). Furthermore, collective bargaining is, in general, conducted primarily at 
company level in the new member states, while the sectoral level is most common for the old 
member states (Ibid.). In these respects, industrial relations in most CEE new member states 
are more reminiscent of those in the USA than in the EU. Slovakia and Slovenia, in some 
respects, are exceptions to this general description, due to the presence of sector-level 
bargaining in these countries and, in the case of the latter, total collective bargaining 
coverage. 
Table 3.1. Union density and bargaining coverage in the CEE countries, 2002 
Country Union density Bargaining coverage 
Czech Republic 30% 25%-30% 
Estonia 14% 28% 
Hungary 20% 31% 
Latvia 15% <20% 
Lithuania 15% 10%-15% 
Poland 15% 40% 
Slovakia 35% 48% 
Slovenia 41% 100% 
Source: EIRO (2003). 
Looking at the developments in industrial relations since the middle of the 1990s, the 
common trend apparent in both old EU countries as well as the new member states is a 
decline in union membership. However, the fall has been much steeper in the new member 
states (especially in the Baltic States, Poland and Hungary) than in the EU-15, so that overall, 
one can say there has been further divergence from old Europe since the mid-1990s. Some of 
the reasons for the decline of unions are to some extent shared between the two groups of 
countries, such as deindustrialisation and an increase in the share of the less unionised 
services sectors. Other causes are specific to the situation of the transition economies, such as 
                                                 
2 The figure for the EU-15 is an unweighted average. Average union density weighted by the relative sizes of the 
countries’ labour forces is 30%, according to EIRO (2003). The corresponding figure for the ten NMS countries 
was 22%. 
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the loss of credibility of the institution of the unions, which had been compulsory under the 
communist regimes. Also, privatisation, high unemployment, and the increase in the number 
of small and medium-sized enterprises have been quoted as reasons behind low unionisation 
rates in the new member states (EIRO 2002). The collective bargaining process is also 
hampered by lack of institutional capacity and resources of the social partners (Ibid.) 
However, it remains to be seen to which effect the European-level co-operation of trade 
unions and employer organisations might have in this regard.  
Figure 3.3. Union density in 1995 and 2002, NMS-8 and EU-13 
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Source: Riboud et al. (2002); EIRO (2003); OECD Employment Outlook (2004). EU-13 excludes 
Luxembourg and Greece. Unweighted averages for NMS-8 and EU-13. 
Employment protection 
Average values for available indexes of the strictness of employment protection legislation 
tend to be fairly similar for EU-15 and CEE (see Figure 3.4).3 However, such averages may 
not be very informative in the case of EPL, concealing considerable variation across the CEE 
countries as well as within the EU-15 group. All of the new Central and Eastern European 
member states have a similar pre-transition background of very strict employment regulations, 
which they all have subsequently relaxed, in order to cope with the need of substantial labour 
reallocation necessary for the process of economic transformation. Yet, due to differing policy 
choices and various country-specific factors, they have ended up with fairly variable levels of 
employment protection. Cazes (2002) notes that a number countries have tended to adopt 
                                                 
3 Employment protection legislation (EPL) indexes are constructed on the basis of a variety of items reflecting 
different aspects such as regulations regarding individual dismissals, collective redundancies, temporary 
employment, etc. The greater the value of the index, the greater the overall strictness of employment protection 
legislation. For details, see e.g. OECD Employment Outlook 2004, p. 102-106, or Eamets and Masso (2005). 
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levels of EPL similar to their closest western neighbours. Also, the relatively richer Central 
European countries (with the exception of Slovenia) appear to be more flexible in their 
employment protection legislation, whereas the poorer Baltic states have opted for levels 
similar to Sweden.  
Figure 3.4. Overall EPL index in the EU*, late 1990s and 2003 
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Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004; Riboud et al; Eamets and  Masso (2005); Kajzer (2005) 
* EU-14 excludes Luxembourg.  
Judging by the overall EPL index, the Czech Republic and Hungary have the most flexible 
regulations among the CEE countries. Slovakia and Poland come next, followed by the three 
Baltic countries and Slovenia with a level of the index close to EU-14 average. The strictness 
of the legislation regarding regular contracts is fairly high, except in Latvia, Hungary and 
Poland where it stands at approximately the EU-14 average level. In the Baltic states and 
Slovenia, collective dismissals are regulated as strictly as in the strictest of the old EU 
countries. In other CEE countries, the regulations are less strict than the EU-14 average, a 
notable change towards increased flexibility occurring in Slovakia with the new 2003 labour 
code.  
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Table 3.2. Employment protection legislation in NMS-8, 2003 
Country Regular 
contracts 
Temporary 
contracts 
Collective 
dismissals Overall EPL 
Czech Republic 3.3 0.5 2.1 1.9 
Estonia 3.1 1.4 4.5 2.6 
Hungary 1.9 1.1 2.9 1.7 
Latvia 2.3 2.1 4.0 2.5 
Lithuania 3.0 1.4 4.9 2.7 
Poland 2.2 1.3 4.1 2.1 
Slovakia 3.5 0.4 2.5 2.0 
Slovenia 2.9 0.6 4.9 2.3 
CEEC average 2.8 1.1 3.7 2.2 
EU-14 average 2.3 2.0 3.4 2.4 
Source: Eamets and Masso (2005), OECD Employment Outlook (2004), Kajzer (2005). Data 
for the Baltic States are for the late 1990s.  EU-14 excludes Luxembourg.  
In the regulation of fixed-term employment contracts, there has been convergence among the 
group of old EU member states from the late 1990s to 2003. Several Southern European 
countries with previously very high levels of the respective EPL indices have relaxed their 
regulations, while previously the most flexible Anglo-Saxon countries have become 
somewhat more restrictive. As of 2003, average EPL on temporary contracts in the old 
member states stands at 2.0. Among the new member states, temporary work is more strictly 
regulated in the Baltics and Poland, whose EPL is relatively close to that of Nordic member 
states. Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, on the other hand, are very flexible, 
resembling Ireland and the UK.  
From the late 1990s to 2003, changes in EPL have occurred in both directions among the CEE 
countries. Regulation on temporary employment has become slightly stricter in Hungary with 
amendment to the labour code that restricted the renewal of fixed term contracts. Poland has 
lifted some renewal restrictions on temporary contracts, but also introduced stricter 
regulations for temporary work agencies, with the overall effect increasing the EPL index for 
temporary contracts from 0.8 to 1.3. The new 2003 labour code in Slovakia has liberalised 
employment regulations with regard to collective dismissals as well as regular employment. 
Evidently, the most significant reforms among the CEE countries have taken place in 
PRAXIS Working Papers No 27/2007 
 15
Slovenia, where the revision of labour code resulted in a drop in the overall EPL index from 
3.5 to 2.3 as of 2003, according to Kajzer (2005).  
Figure 3.5. Employment protection and passive labour market policies in the EU 
NL
DK
IE
IT
FI AT
BEDE
SE
FR
ES
PL
CZ
SK
HU
LV
EE
LT y = -0.1x + 2.2
R2 = 0.0
y = -10.4x + 2.6
R2 = 0.4
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.2
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Expenditure on passive LMP, % of GDP / unemployment rate
EP
L
EU CEE
 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues; Vodopivec et al. (2003); Paas et al. 
(2003); authors’ calculations. Latest available data.  
Figure 3.5 shows the combinations of employment protection and unemployment insurance 
systems in European countries. Among the new member states, there appears to be a negative 
correlation between strictness of EPL and generosity of UI. The group of Baltic States have 
higher EPL and less generous unemployment benefits, while the Central European countries 
have more flexible regulations combined with more generous UI systems. However, even the 
countries with most generous UI remain in the lower end of expenditure on passive measures 
among European countries. Given also the very low spending on active labour market policies 
in the CEE countries, the group appears very far indeed from the so-called flexicurity model 
exemplified by Denmark.  
In making cross-country comparisons of EPL indicators, an important caveat to be kept in 
mind is that there may be gaps between regulations and actual enforcement of these 
regulations, which can vary across countries. Thus, even though EPL may nominally be strict 
in a particular country, effective flexibility may be increased by weak enforcement of 
regulations and easily available work-arounds such as formal self-employment, rental labour, 
informal work, or simply disregarding regulations. Cazes and Nesporova (2003) find a 
positive association with stricter EPL and temporary employment. Eamets and Masso (2005), 
examining the case of the Baltic states, find evidence of numerous violations of the labour 
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code, under-reporting of violations, and voluntary forfeit/resignation of employee rights in 
employment contracts. They also find a remarkably weak relationship between the EPL index 
and the employers’ assessment of hiring and firing practices.  
It might be expected that the actual strictness of employment protection is gradually 
converging towards its nominal value, as the enforcement of regulations is gradually 
strengthened and institutional quality improves. However, this does not appear to be the case 
for e.g. the Baltic states, for which employers’ assessment of the hiring and firing practices 
indicate gradual increase in flexibility rather than vice versa. Also, despite the impressive-
looking EPL liberalisation reforms, the hiring and firing practices in Slovenia are still 
considered the most restrictive among the CEE-8 countries by employers, with little change 
since 2000 (Gwartney et al. 2005). 
Active labour market policies 
Active labour market policies such as labour market training, job subsidies, business start-up 
subsidies and various targeted measures have been introduced in all new member states. 
However, the levels of spending on such programmes are very low. Furthermore, the 
spending has been lagging behind the growth of GDP, so that spending has tended to decrease 
over the past decade in relation to GDP. This is the case even in countries like Poland and 
Slovakia in which unemployment rates have been very high in recent years. If, as above with 
passive labour market expenditure, we consider ALMP spending as a percentage of GDP 
divided by the unemployment rate, the average level in Central and Eastern European 
countries for which data are available amounts to only approximately 10% of the respective 
EU figure. However, despite the low levels of spending, there is some positive evidence on 
the effectiveness of some active policies are the new member states (Ederveen and Thissen 
2004). Also, it is likely that the expenditure figures will somewhat increase in the near future 
as resources from the European Social Fund start complementing national spending on active 
labour market policies.  
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Table 3.3. Expenditure on active labour market policies, % of GDP 
(in brackets: normalised on the percent unemployment rate) 
Country 1996 2004 
Czech Republic 0.12 (0.031) 0.133 (0.016) 
Estonia 0.06 (0.006) 0.043 (0.004) 
Hungary 0.37 (0.039) 0.207 (0.034) 
Latvia 0.16 (0.012)* 0.085 (0.007) 
Lithuania 0.09 (0.006) 0.154 (0.015) 
Poland 0.49 (0.040) 0.16 (0.008) 
Slovakia 0.56 (0.048) 0.072 (0.004) 
NMS-7 average 0.26 (0.026) 0.12 (0.013) 
EU-14 average 1.17 (0.13) 0.7 (0.11) 
Source: Eurostat; OECD Employment Outlook 1999-2005; Paas et al. (2003).  
* 1998 data for Latvia. 
Summary of developments  
Table 3.4 below summarizes the developments in labour market institutions in the Central and 
Eastern European economies during the past decade. The signs signify the direction of change 
in the respective indicator. Thus, e.g. a plus sign in the UI generosity column means that 
generosity has increased. Areas in which the clearest trends emerge are unions and collective 
bargaining coverage, which have declined in all countries. Labour taxes have been falling in 
most countries and remained stable in others. Expenditure on active labour market 
programmes has decreased in most countries for which data are available. The more diverse 
categories are employment protection, which has become stricter in Hungary and Poland and 
relaxed or remained stable elsewhere. The generosity of unemployment insurance systems has 
either declined or remained stable in most countries, Estonia being the sole exception. 
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Table 3.4. Changes in labour market institutions in NMS-8, mid-1990s to post-2000 
Country UI generosity ALMP Union density 
Bargaining 
coverage EPL
* Labour taxes 
Czech Republic 0 – – 0 0 0 
Estonia + – – 0 – – 
Hungary – + – – + – 
Latvia – – – – – – 
Lithuania 0 + – 0 – – 
Poland – – – – + – 
Slovakia – – – – – – 
Slovenia 0  – 0 – 0 
 * The downward trend in EPL for Baltic states is based on the hiring and firing index in Gwartney et 
al. (2005). 
When these changes are set against those among EU-15 countries, some general common 
trends become apparent, like e.g. the decline in unionization, which however is much more 
pronounced in the new member states so that the gaps between the new and old member states 
have widened over the past decade. Divergence has also occurred in labour taxation, with the 
EU average mostly remaining stable whereas NMS average has declined; and active labour 
market policies, which have received increasing resources in the EU while expenditure in the 
NMS has declined. Although in several NMS economies, employment protection has been 
relaxed with unemployment insurance at the same time becoming more generous, there has 
been no substantial advance towards the “flexicurity” model promoted by the EU. Even in the 
most generous NMS, spending on passive labour market policy remains near the EU-15 
minimum. We can conclude that although European integration and the EU accession process 
has exerted real influence on the development of national labour market institutions in the 
NMS, the overall picture is that of institutional divergence. 
4. Empirical analysis 
OECD 1960-1999 
What conclusions can be made from the above discussion with regard to growth effects of 
trends in labour market institutions in the NMS? As we have seen from the brief survey in 
Section 2, for most institutions different theoretical models predict different effects on 
productivity growth; in some models the impact is ambiguous and depends on values of 
particular parameters. Here, we attempt to approach the question empirically. First, we take a 
look at the past experience of OECD countries by estimating some summary growth 
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regressions with labour market institutions as explanatory variables. Essentially similar 
exercises have been carried out by Nickell and Layard (1999) using cross-country data. The 
main difference of our approach consists in our use of a panel data set. We use a sample 
which includes most Western European countries plus the US, Japan, New Zealand, Canada 
and Australia (for details, see the Data Appendix). The data are averaged over non-
overlapping five-year periods between 1970 and 1999. Data from labour market institutions 
are from the dataset of Belot and Van Ours (2004). The five-year averages are suitable both 
because annual data would not contain enough variation in institutional variables and also 
because we are interested in longer-run relationships between institutional variables and 
productivity growth.  
We estimate the traditional growth regression in the following form:  
tiitititi Xyy ,,1,, ' εηβα +++=∆ − ,        (1) 
where y is the logarithm of real GDP per worker (GDP per hour worked was also used), X is a 
set of explanatory variables, η is a country-specific effect, and ε the error term. The i and t 
subscripts denote country and time period, respectively. The set of explanatory variables 
includes investment share in GDP, labour tax rate, an index of employment protection, 
unemployment benefit replacement rates, union density, the degree of centralization of 
collective bargaining, and active labour market policies (see Data Appendix on variables).  
Separate sets of equations were estimated with growth of GDP per worker and GDP per hour 
worked as the dependent variable, as well as with and without country-specific fixed effects. 
The estimation results from the growth regressions are shown in Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Annex. The tax rate variable was significant and with a negative coefficient in the fixed 
effects equations. However, it turned insignificant when growth of GDP per hour worked was 
used as the dependent variable. Unemployment benefit replacement rate was significant and 
positive in fixed effects specifications with per worker productivity growth, but negative with 
per hour GDP growth equations with fixed effects. The active labour market policies variable 
entered with a negative sign and turned insignificant when country fixed effects were 
introduced in the model. Its inclusion in the model affected the signs and significance of other 
variables, one of the reasons for which is probably the shorter time period (1985-1999) for 
which equations with ALMP could be estimated. Employment protection, in equations where 
it was significant, had a positive sign. The union density variable was negative in equations 
where it was significant, with the exception of one case where ALMP was also included.  
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Two interaction terms were also included in the regressions, one for the interaction between 
employment protection and centralization and the other for union density and centralization. 
The first term was significant and negative in all specifications. The second was significant 
and negative in the labour productivity growth regression with fixed effects, but positive in 
the model with hours and no fixed effects.  
Nickell and Layard (1999) found that variables for labour market institutions turned 
insignificant once the initial productivity variable was included in growth regressions. In 
contrast, in all of our specifications, the corresponding term was included and had a correct 
sign (except in the presence of active labour market policy variable), while labour market 
institutions retained their significance. Our results broadly confirm their results for the 
negative effect of labour taxation and positive effect of employment protection. However, 
some the institutional variables appear fairly sensitive to the particular sets of variables used, 
and the use of GDP per hour vs. per worker growth seems to affect the results in some cases.  
We also estimated equations to see whether any of the labour market institutions can explain 
growth of total factor productivity. This enables us to see whether the significant labour 
market institution variables affect productivity growth through their influence on input 
accumulation, or whether their impact occurs separately from inputs. Table A3 presents the 
results of a simple regression of TFP on all institutional variables. The replacement rate, the 
degree of centralization and the union density emerge as significant variables here. However, 
their signs are different in models with and without country fixed effects.  
The new member states 
As of 2004, the average GDP per hour worked in the eight Central and Eastern European 
countries made up 46.5% of the corresponding EU-15 figure. Since 1995, the difference has 
declined by 8 percentage points. Estonia and Lithuania have made the most progress in 
closing their respective gaps with the Western European levels, although they remain among 
the least productive of the new member states. Slovenia is in the leading position with the 
highest productivity among the NMS-8 at 63% of the EU-15 average, approximately the level 
of Spain relative to France in 1960 (Caselli and Tenreyro 2005). The average NMS-8 hourly 
productivity figure of 46.5% of EU-15 is lower than that of GDP per worker, which stands at 
54% of the Western European level. This is due to a higher average number of hours worked 
in the Central and Eastern European countries: in 2004, the average annual number of hours 
worked per employee was 2001 in NMS-8 and 1589 in EU-15.  
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Figure 4.1. GDP per hour gaps between NMS-8 and EU-15, 1995 and 2004 
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Source: GGDC, authors’ calculations. 
In Figure 4.2 we have plotted the average growth rates of GDP per hour worked over the past 
decade against the level of GDP per hour in 1995. There is a clear inverse relationship, with 
the poorest Baltic states growing the fastest, Poland and Slovakia are in the middle with 
annual growth rates between 4 and 5%, and the richest countries, Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovenia have had the slowest growth rates. This relationship suggests that the 
convergence process may provide the most significant explanatory variable in the relationship 
explaining differences in growth rates among the NMS. Simple scatter plots between 
productivity growth and institutional variables are therefore not likely to be informative in 
revealing actual relationships.  
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Figure 4.2. Growth 1996-2004 and GDP per hour 1995 in NMS-8 
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                   Source: GGDC, authors’ calculations. 
In the next regression, we have also included in the sample observations for the NMS-8 in the 
periods 1995-1999 and 2000-2004. The results are reported in Table A4. Obviously, the 
smaller sample imposes limitations on the possibilities for analysis here, and one must also 
keep in mind that the various measurement issues, such as e.g. those related to employment 
protection discussed above, are likely to be more serious in the CEE countries than in Western 
Europe. One result similar to the sample above is that of the negative correlation of active 
labour market policies. Both union density and the degree of centralisation are significant and 
have negative signs, but the effect disappears when other institutional variables are also 
included in the sample. The effects of other labour market institutions do not appear to be 
significant. In this sample, the convergence variable explains most of the variation in growth 
rates, and apart from taxation, effects of labour market institutions are not apparent.  
 
5. Conclusions 
We have examined the developments of the labour market institutions in the Central and 
Eastern European new EU member states during the decade prior to accession. The trends 
shared between all countries in this group are declines in the rates of unionization and the 
coverage of collective bargaining. In most countries, the taxation of labour has also declined. 
In the majority of countries, expenditure on active labour market policies has not kept up with 
GDP growth. The relative decline of ALMP spending appears especially pronounced when 
viewed on the background of substantially increased unemployment rates. Spending on 
passive measures has also been lower in most countries toward the end of the period under 
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review in comparison with mid-1990s. The situation is more varied in indicators of the 
strictness of employment protection legislation. Regulations have been relaxed in Slovenia 
and Slovakia; employers’ assessments of hiring and firing procedures have become more 
favourable also in the Baltic States. The more flexible countries, Hungary and Poland, on the 
other hand, have tightened their regulations somewhat with regard to temporary work.  
Some of the trends have been in the same direction in the NMS and Western European 
countries. Unions have weakened in both groups of countries, but the new member states have 
moved more rapidly towards lower unionisation and less decentralised bargaining systems, so 
that there has been divergence in this regard. Taxation of labour remained mostly stable in 
EU-15, whereas it has fallen in most NMS countries, however the latter development has to 
be viewed against the background of fairly high levels of labour taxation in the CEE. 
Divergence has occurred also in spending on both active and passive labour market policies. 
One can perhaps speak of institutional convergence to the EU in the sense that largely similar 
institutions have been adopted, but the parameters of the systems differ in important ways. 
As for the possible effects of the labour market institutions on productivity growth, results 
from previous empirical studies indicate that high labour taxes may be detrimental for growth. 
Negative effects of unionisation have been found in a number of studies. The effects of 
employment protection legislation have been found harmful to innovative activity and growth 
at industry level, although positive effects have been found in cross-country regressions with 
aggregate productivity.  
Estimating a regression using panel data on OECD countries in the period 1970-1999 with 
labour market institutions as explanatory variables, the results confirm the negative sign of the 
labour tax variable. However, the variable turns insignificant when hourly productivity is used 
as the dependent variable, indicating that taxes may affect productivity through the effects on 
hours worked. In case of employment protection, union density and centralization of 
bargaining, the effects seem to depend on particular combinations of these institutions and 
their interactions. For active labour market policies, positive effects were not found. In a 
smaller sample including also the NMS countries, the convergence term explained most of the 
differences in growth rates. Labour market institutions were generally insignificant, with the 
exception of the negative effects of ALMP, union density and bargaining centralisation in 
some specifications.  
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Data Appendix 
GDP, employment, hours: GGDC.  
Investment: AMECO Database.  
TFP: For OECD, estimates were derived from data in AMECO database.  
Data on labour market institutions for OECD 1960-1999 are from the dataset by Belot and 
van Ours (2004). Data for NMS:  
EPL index: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues; Eamets and Masso (2004); Paas et 
al. (2003); Kajzer (2005). Variable was normalised to the same scale as the series as used by 
BvO.  
Union density: EIRO (2002), Riboud et al. (2003).  
Collective bargaining coverage: EIRO 2002, Riboud et al. 2003; Paas et al. 2003.  
Passive labour market policy expenditure: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues; Paas 
et al. (2003); Vodopivec et al. (2003); Eurostat (2006). 
Active labour market policy expenditure: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues; Paas 
et al. (2003); Eurostat (2006). 
Implicit tax rates: European Commission (2005). 
Tax wedge: European Commission (2005), OECD Employment Outlook, various issues, 
World Bank (2005).  
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Annex. Estimation results  
Table A1. Dependent variable log differenced GDP per worker, 5-year averages 1970-
1999 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tax rate 0.031 -0.05 0.033 -0.291*** -0.082 -0.31*** 
 (0.52) (1.17) (0.49) (4.45) (1.0) (4.69) 
Replacement rate  0.031 -0.089*** 0.014 0.146*** 0.206*** 0.15*** 
 (1.02) (3.44) (0.49) (3.13) (2.99) (3.04) 
Centralization (cen) -0.01 0.008 0.025 -0.007 -0.011 0.122*** 
 (1.29) (0.84) (1.34) (1.28) (1.43) (2.93) 
Empl. protection (ep) 0.014* 0.013 0.023 -0.025 -0.071*** 0.08** 
 (1.73) (1.46) (1.01) (1.6) (3.41) (2.15) 
Union density (ud) -0.046** 0.12*** 0.053 -0.101* -0.119 0.064 
 (2.06) (4.98) (0.58) (1.9) (1.2) (0.61) 
ALMP  -0.085***   0.012  
  (2.86)   (0.44)  
cen*ep   -0.007   -0.04*** 
   (0.77)   (3.03) 
ud*cen   -0.052   -0.153** 
   (1.17)   (2.37) 
yt-1 -0.208*** 0.026 -0.212*** -0.211*** -0.005 -0.198*** 
 (6.71) (1.25) (6.29) (6.94) (0.28) (6.37) 
Investment  rate -0.153 -0.153 -0.201 -0.412** -0.08 -0.469*** 
 (1.2) (1.09) (1.32) (2.55) (0.66) (3.16) 
R2 0.60 0.87 0.95 0.84 0.95 0.84 
Obs 104 61 104 104 61 104 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
In parentheses under coefficients, t-values based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Where active labour market policies are included in the specification, the time period is 1985-1999. 
 
Table A2. Dependent variable log differenced GDP per hour worked, 1970-1999 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tax rate -0.022 -0.033 -0.014 -0.047 0.116 -0.038 
 (0.45) (0.9) (0.24) (0.76) (1.63) (0.62) 
Replacement rate  0.052** -0.04* 0.043** -0.143** -0.01 -0.105* 
 (2.08) (1.68) (2.4) (2.61) (0.73) (1.89) 
Centralization (CEN) 0.009 0.015** 0.037*** -0.011** -0.007*** 0.041 
 (1.41) (2.22) (3.23) (1.99) (2.96) (1.58) 
Empl. protection 
(EP) 
0.027*** 0.017** 0.108*** 0.012 -0.011 0.085*** 
 (4.24) (2.41) (8.52) (0.9) (1.25) (2.89) 
ALMP   -0.137***   -0.008  
  (6.22)   (1.18)  
Union density (UD) -0.037* 0.075*** -0.177*** 0.003 -0.056 -0.051 
 (1.95) (3.44) (3.59) (0.07) (1.22) (0.69) 
CEN*EP   -0.046***   -0.028*** 
   (9.54)   (3.17) 
UD*CEN   0.059**   -0.017 
   (2.47)   (0.45) 
yt-1 -0.148*** 0.15** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.082*** -0.137*** 
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 (7.2) (2.11) (6.34) (6.24) (6.79)  (6.2) 
Investment  rate -0.28** -0.016 -0.354*** -0.459*** -0.214*** -0.425*** 
 (2.46) (0.16) (2.8) (3.62) (3.53) (3.57) 
R2 0.77 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.98 0.78 
Obs 89 61 89 89 61 89 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
In parentheses under coefficients, t-values based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Where active labour market policies are included in the specification, the time period is 1985-1999. 
 
 
 
Table A3. Dependent variable log differenced TFP, 1970-1999 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax rate 0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.83) (0.13) (0.25) (0.63) 
Replacement rate  -0.007* 0.001 0.024*** 0.034*** 
 (1.91) (0.34) (2.98) (2.7) 
Centralization (CEN) 0.001 -0.007*** -0.005*** 0 
 (0.51) (2.69) (5.12) (0.04) 
Empl. protection 
(EP) 
0 0.004 -0.004 0.006 
 (0.3) (0.91) (1.41) (0.97) 
Union density (UD) 0.011*** -0.035* -0.058*** -0.062*** 
 (3.45) (2.0) (4.14) (3.11) 
     
CEN*EP  -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.76)  (1.64) 
UD*CEN  0.022**  0.001 
  (2.61)  (0.05) 
R2 0.32 0.39 0.63 0.63 
Obs 76 76 76 76 
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
In parentheses under coefficients, t-values based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A4. Dependent variable log differenced GDP per hour worked, EU incl. NMS 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 0.06*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.08*** 0.068*** 0.072*** 
 (3.8) (3.8) (3.99) (3.56) (3.62) (4.36) (4.05) (2.74) 
yt-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-5.13) (-4.85) (-4.28) (-4.56) (-4.75) (-5.69) (-5.44) (-2.98) 
Investment/GDP -0.03 -0.014  -0.001    -0.02 
 (-0.48) (-0.23)  (-0.02)    (-0.21) 
Employment 
protection legislation 
 -0.003      0.002 
  (-1.37)      (0.31) 
Tax wedge   0     0 
   (-1.06)     (-0.01) 
Passive LMP    -0.011    -0.001 
    (-1.55)    (-0.05) 
ALMP     -0.026***   -0.018* 
     (-5.43)   (-1.78) 
Union density      -0.016***  -0.006 
      (-2.77)  (-0.61) 
Centralisation       -0.005* -0.003 
       (-1.82) (-0.79) 
R2 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.61 0.55 0.53 0.63 
Total obs 74 74 61 59 53 73 74 51 
Time period: 1975-2004, when ALMP or PLMP is included: 1980-2004, observations for NMS: 1995-1999 and 2000-2004 
In parentheses under coefficients, t-values based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Countries included: AT, BE, CZ, DK, DE, EE, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, NL, LT, PL, SE, SI, SK, UK 
